The 2015 Paris Agreement set an objective of limiting average global average temperature increase to well below 2°C, with best efforts not to exceed 1.5°C. To that end, Parties have put forth an unprecedented set of national commitments – the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). However, the mitigation component of these NDCs falls short of what is needed to meet the temperature objectives. To address this shortfall, the Paris Agreement includes five-year cycles, starting in 2018, to review and enhance climate action.

The Facilitative Dialogue 2018, called for in the Paris decisions, is a key element for the successful implementation of the review-and-ratchet mechanism agreed to by 195 countries. It provides an opportunity for the collective assessment of current pledges and for paving the way for greater ambition, building on scientific information, the inputs of various stakeholders and equity considerations. At COP22, parties requested the COP22 and COP23 Presidencies to consult on the organisation of the Dialogue and report back to COP23. The design must be finalised in Bonn so that Parties can start the Dialogue as early as possible in 2018. The Facilitative Dialogue is increasingly referred to as the Talanoa Dialogue - a reference to a traditional Fijian consensus-building process based on inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue and story-telling.

This Dialogue must lead to an outcome at COP24 that encourages and provides the conditions for countries to update their NDCs and align them with the Paris climate objectives, informed by scientific information and equity considerations. By 2020, revised NDCs with stronger climate targets are required to protect the world from the impacts of 3°C or more of warming. This process can also help countries advance national development goals by tapping into opportunities for climate action that are not currently reflected in the NDCs. Most importantly, the FD2018 needs to go beyond simply recognising the ambition gap; it must identify concrete steps to address it. A successful FD2018 must ultimately provide a solid base for the updating of NDCs by Parties by 2020.

This paper discusses and makes proposals for how the Talanoa Dialogue should be organised.
The Talanoa Dialogue should not be viewed as a single event that takes place at COP24; rather, it is a year-long process. It should start with a recognition of efforts to date and the ambition gap that remains. The process should be inclusive and take advantage of the momentum of non-state actors - it needs to allow observers to participate and must build on outputs from the Marrakesh Partnership for Global Climate Action. The process should culminate by emphasizing opportunities for reducing emissions in line with development goals; recognizing countries that have revised and/or committed to revise their NDCs; sharing lessons learned in developing and implementing NDCs; and by announcing a collective intention to enhance NDCs. Importantly, the process must be inclusive and take advantage of non-state actor momentum. It should allow the participation of observers and must build on inputs from the Marrakesh Partnership for Global Climate Action.

For the outcome of the COP23 on the Talanoa Dialogue, we propose that:

- A **report**, including features and a roadmap for the Dialogue (see below), is jointly prepared by COP22 and COP23 Presidencies as requested by 1/CP.22;
- A **COP23 decision** that welcomes the report and requests COP23 and COP24 Presidencies to jointly conduct the Dialogue, based on the outline designed in the report, with the Secretariat’s support.

### The Roadmap: How Should the Talanoa Dialogue be Organised?

The roadmap for the Dialogue should outline how it will be organised throughout 2018 and include at least the following key elements:

- **The Dialogue should be formally convened** as early as possible in 2018, at an intersessional meeting or special event.
- **Bonn SB/APA Session**: A series of open sessions aimed at Party and non-Party stakeholders should be organised, to solicit information, analyses and other input.
- **Invite written submissions** and reports from Parties, Observers and other stakeholders.
- **California’s Global Climate Action Summit 2018**: During this event, cities, sub-national governments, companies and civil society organisations will share progress in implementing their commitments and make new announcements to support the enhancement of NDCs. The Talanoa Dialogue should inform this Summit and receive outputs from the summit.
- **A high-level special event before/after UNGA**: This event should aim to generate political momentum for the Dialogue with, for example, declarations by leaders recognising the ambition gap and pledging to raise ambition; presentations of enhanced targets by countries that have already increased ambition; and progress reports from countries who are accelerating implementation of their NDCs.
- **A high-level event at COP24**: A high-level dialogue should be organized among ministers and, after the event, a decision has to be taken to welcome a report from the FD2018 process run by COP23 and COP24 Presidencies.

Although the roadmap cannot determine how non-UNFCCC events are organized, such as the California summit and the UNGA high-level event, the Dialogue can inform these events through presentations and briefs, and should clearly state that the FD2018 will receive inputs from them.

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1. [https://globalclimateactionsummit.org](https://globalclimateactionsummit.org)
Non-Exhaustive List of relevant Inputs including existing ones

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
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<tr>
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<td>IPCC Special Report on 1.5°C</td>
<td>IPCC</td>
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<td>Non-Party Stakeholders’ Action</td>
<td>Yearbook of Global Climate Action</td>
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<td>Mitigation</td>
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<td>Reports from bodies responsible for GHG emissions and climate forcers not (necessarily) covered by NDCs and transparency framework.</td>
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<td>Finance</td>
<td>Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>“Key Messages to Parties” (recommendations on policies and strategies)</td>
<td>TEC</td>
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What Do We Need?

The Talanoa dialogue must result first in a COP24 decision in which Parties signal an intent to raise their collective ambition by 2020; and second, a COP24 decision that invites individual Parties to revisit their NDCs and to announce the outcome, either individually or collectively, by COP26 in 2020. While different kinds of announcements and improvements can be valuable, a collective expression of intent to increase the ambition of NDCs would send an unmistakable signal of determination of parties to align their economic and development plans with the goals of the Paris Agreement.

We need action by Parties that is commensurate with the scale of the problem. A necessary element of this is for Parties to revise their NDCs by 2020 with more ambitious mitigation targets that align with the Paris Agreement’s temperature objective. Some of this additional mitigation action can in many cases be funding with internal resources, but to scale up effort at the level necessary, international cooperation, involving financial, technical and capacity building support, will also need to be scaled up. Parties can also improve the adaptation components of their NDCs, and resources for this should also be provided. Discussions of improved support for adaptation and Loss and Damage should complement the Dialogue. However, the Talanoa Dialogue will not fulfill its intended purpose if it does not result in increased mitigation targets by 2020.

Parties can enhance their mitigation targets in several ways. For example they can submit stronger national targets based on improved economy-wide and/or sector-specific policies and measures. In addition, many Parties can complement their individual efforts by forming technological or financial partnerships that help willing countries who require support to enhance their targets. Those various measures of enhancement can be compiled as a potential output of the Dialogue.